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Rousseau and Kant) that have informed liberal politics, and the other,
if not greater, darkness, in the form of religiously inspired violence,
. against which liberalism has also historically struggled. In slighting
that nobler, if partly mistaken, motive, Tuck's otherwise incisive study
fails to do liberalism full justice.

SUSAN M. SHELL
Boston College

Unnecessary Evil: History and Moral Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel
Kant. By Sharon Anderson-Gold. Albany: State University of New York
Press, 200 I. Pp. xiii, 138. ISBN 0-7914-4819-3 (hbk) $50.50;
0-7914-4820-7 (pbk) $17.95.
This slim volume offers a very valuable contribution to the ongoing
explication and reconstruction of Kant's ethics as a social ethics.
Anderson-Gold shares the increasingly common Kant reading that his
notion of the highest good as the universal union of virtue and
happiness is to b~ understood as a social ideal that sets 'collective
moral goals'. This reading sees Kant's writings on history as integral
to his moral theory in that one must assess how much, and in what
way, progress has been made toward realizing the ideal in order to
articulate specific social duties. Anderson-Gold discusses in several
chapters Kant's view of historical progress and the reflective
judgement that enables us to articulate and assess such progress. She
pays special attention to his idea that the enthusiasm that the French
Revolution engendered among its spectators shows that a moral
cause, or a genuine concern with universal welfare, is operative in
humanity. Her analysis of this public of spectators leads to an
interesting discussion of emerging pluralistic 'cosmopolitan publics'
in our own time as a precondition for future peace, jlfstice and local
and global democracy. In the final chapter of her book, AndersonGold further articulates contemporary Kantian social:' duties,
supplementing her political-legal and cosmopolitan public proposals
with Kantian arguments for sustainable economic development. The
core of her work, however, is to argue that Kant's much neglected
doctrine of radical evil is crucial to his social ethics, both as a matter
of textual accuracy and in 1;erms of its contemporary reconstruction.
This argument will be the focus of the remainder of this review.
136

KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 6, 2002

Anderson-Gold maintains that, even though an increasing number
of contemporary Kant scholars, such as Yirmiahu Yovel and more
recently Pauline Kleingeld, have correctly interpreted the highest good
as a social and historical ideal, 'none hav~ provided an adequate
explanation of how such a goal is related to the moral life of
individuals' (p. 6). Notably, they have not offered an account of 'how
it is that individuals have a personal stake in the promotion of this
ideal' (p. 7). The doctrine of radical evil provides such an account
once it is recognized that the propensity to evil that Kant ascribed to
humanity emerges only in a social context. Anderson-Gold cites
Kant's claim in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (tr. T. M.
Greene and H. H. Hudson, p. 85) that
envy, the lust for power, greed, and the malignant inclinations bound up
with these, besiege [the individual's] nature, contented within itself, as
soon as he is among men, and it is not even necessary to assume that these
are men sunk in evil and examples to lead him astray. (Ak. 6: 93-4)

She clarifies: 'The propensity to evil is not something that is simply
'within me' and 'within you', but something that operates within our
very mode of association' (p. 46). This means that 'Kant implies that
our hope to effect a revolution "within" [the overcoming of evil and
the striving for moral perfection] rests upon the transformation of the
social condition of our existence'. Anderson-Gold adds that striving
for virtue viewed as a private enterprise is 'futile' (p. 46), citing with
approval Kant's view that we must leave the 'ethical state of nature'
and unite in ethical communities for the sake of collectively
combating evil, for without such communities individuals, no matter
how much they 'may have done to throw off tIie sovereignty of evil',
are 'incessantly in danger of falling back under its dominion'
(Religion, p. 86). The highest good as social ideal and the moral life of
the individual, then, are intrinsically connected. Individual moral
progress requires collective moral improvement, and the individual
striving for moral perfection requires that one joins and actively
participates in voluntary associations of virtue that aim at the highest
good.
Anderson-Gold rightly holds that Kant's thesis of the innate
propensity to evil as it relates to the highest good has received
inadequate attention and her work' admirably fills the gap. Still, this
leaves the question open whether a further development of Kant's
KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 6,2002
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social ethics (as is Anderson-Gold's aim) should proceed along these
lines. One problem is that Kant only mentions churches as imperfect
examples of ethical communities and that he emphasized that full
moral emancipation requires that religious institutions are eventually
cast aside and replaced by a 'church invisible' or 'inner' unification of
good wills. Thus the struggle for moral perfection falls back from a
collective undertaking to an individual one. Anderson-Gold needs to
address systematically why Kant took this step. Another difficulty is
that the focus on innate evil may not be compatible with the view of
the highest good as a universal task. Anderson-Gold maintains that
moral commitment to the ethical community and its aims requires
moral faith, a faith in 'God as Absolute Person, through whose
continuous presence the moral law abides while our commitments
waver' (p. 51). I am not sure what to make of this statement and doubt
that it fits with Kant's overall view. Does Anderson-Gold want to say
that those who do not believe in such a Being are doomed to fail in
their endeavour to live a socially committed and righteous life? At any
rate, Anderson-Gold's claim seems incompatible with he~ attempt to
show the contemporary relevance of Kant's social ethics by arguing
that 'voluntary associations formed [in our time] to promote the basic
interests and rights of world citizens are social instantiations of
ethical communities', and that 'ethical communities need not be
limited to communities of religious faith, although they often do in
fact arise from such communities' (p. 108). Her commitment to a
clearly Christian conception of evil is in tension with her defence of
pluralism. A final problem is that Kant held that good legal
conditions are necessary for the emergence of the highest, good as
social ideal, but that legal institutions themselves are not a locus of
moral emancipation. The view of moral development as the
overcoming of evil seems to strengthen this institutional bias that is
antithetical to directly grounding social duties.
The upshot is that a convincing Kantian social ethics may need to
break more fundamentally with Kant than Anderson-Gold envisions.
More importantly, it may be that for the purpose of bringing Kant's
ethics to a higher social plane it would be better to develop further his
notions of autonomy and heteronomy as individual and social
concepts than to do the same for his ideas of innate evil and striving
for moral perfection.
The title of Anderson-Gpld's work indicates that her vision of
moral progress and the huma~ predicament is far from optimistic. No

Beginners in philosophy very often find Kant's works hard to read.
They appear difficult to them not only because his philosophy is as
complex and difficult as it is, but also because Kant does not present
his theories in a reader-friendly way. He uses long, complex sentences,
misleading examples, yet he is enigmatic and brief where he should be
clear and detailed (and vice versa), dry and practically without jokes
(though his tone is sometimes ironical and mocking). It is hard stuff,
and not only for beginners.
It is all the more important that a commentator should make
Kant's texts and his arguments readable and understandable.
Naturally, this is particularly true for all those who write
introductions and overviews and who address beginners. Peter'
Baumann's small book on Kants Ethik is meant to be such a book for
beginners. It goes back to a course given at the University of Hagen
(where students work at home, not in real classes), but since theil it
has been entirely revised. Baumanns intends a 'Heranfiihrung' (p. 7),
an 'Orientierung' (S.7) which presents the 'Grundlehre' (the book's
subtitle) of Kant's ethics.
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doubt, we are the beneficiaries of the toil of previous generations, but
our gain comes with a definite price. Anderson-Gold perceptively
notes:
The moral life of later generations is in some respects more challenging
than the moral life of earlier generations. As the scope and complexity of
institutional life grows, the need for an educated and enlightened public
increases. When social-cultural opportunities for such enlightenment are
present, the individual has a stronger duty to participate and maintain
these conditions for future generations. (p. 102)

She concludes her book in the same vein: 'Moral life will become
increasingly challenging' (p. 110). Anderson~Gold's study offers a
worthy avenue for helping us to meet this challenge.

HARRY VAN DER LINDEN
Butler University

Kants Ethik: Die Grundlehre. By Peter Baumanns. WLirzburg: Konigshausen
und Neumann, 2000. Pp. 120. ISBN 3-8260-1931-8, DM 28.
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